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SUMMARY 
According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid 
by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European 
Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of 
homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is 
likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to 
understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in 
imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the 
wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the 
increase in pay. 
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RESUME 
Dans la théorie de Becker [1964], lorsque le marché du travail est en concurrence parfaite, seuls les 
salariéss investissent dans la formation générale, car ils sont les seuls à pouvoir s’approprier les retombées 
bénéfiques de la formation. Par conséquent, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, plus la prime salariale à la 
formation est élevée et plus l’investissement en formation est importante. Sur la base des données du Panel 
Communautaire des Ménages, nous calculons une proxy de la prime salariale à la formation pour des 
groupes homogènes de salariés et nous trouvons une relation inverse entre cette proxy et l’incidence de la 
formation hors site, qui concerne, selon toute vraisemblance, des compétences relativement générales. Nos 
résultats suggèrent que le modèle de Becker ne fournit pas une clé interprétative suffisante pour 
comprendre les tendances empiriques de la formation. Par contre, la distribution de la formation ne semble 
pas être en contradiction avec les théories de la formation qui prévoient que, lorsque le marché du travail 
est en concurrence imparfaite, les entreprises peuvent être disposées à investir en formation si 
l’augmentation de la productivité qui en découle est supérieure à l’augmentation du salaire. 
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IS TRAINING MORE FREQUENT WHEN THE WAGE PREMIUM IS SMALLER? EVIDENCE 
FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HOUSEHOLD PANEL 
1. Introduction 
1.  Human capital is a key determinant of economic growth. The amount of training individuals 
receive during their working life has a significant impact on their career prospects, wages and 
employability. Moreover, improving workers’ competencies is crucial in the face of rapid technological 
change. In spite of the broad consensus on the importance of training, there is a large debate in the 
economic literature and in policy circles concerning whether the current level of investment in training is 
efficient and which agent (employer or employee) has the greater incentive to invest. 
2.  According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training — 
that is training which raises productivity at other employers to the same extent as at the employer who 
provides it — is fully paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. However, 
although few surveys have information on the generality of skills, in those that do, most of the reported 
job-related training appears to be employer-paid, at least partially, even when it is viewed by respondents 
as general (Barron, Berger and Black [1999], Loewenstein and Spletzer [1999], Booth and Bryan [2005]). 
Furthermore, in many surveys, employers appear to pay for most of off-site training (OECD [2003]), 
which is found by Loewenstein and Spletzer [1999] to be essentially general. This evidence is difficult to 
reconcile with Becker’s model unless we argue that the employee fully compensates the employer by 
accepting lower wages during (or before) training spells. Yet, no clear empirical support exists for this fact 
in the literature.
1  
3.  Recent theories of imperfect competition in the labour market can explain why employers have 
an incentive to pay for apparently general human capital. If the market for trained workers is less 
competitive than the market for untrained workers, the ratio of wages to productivity is lower for trained 
than for untrained workers — that is, wages are compressed with respect to productivity along the training 
dimension. In these circumstances, the employer has an incentive to train because he can afford to pay a 
trained worker less than the marginal product while still retaining her (see e.g. Katz and Zidermann [1990], 
Stevens [1994], Acemoglu and Pischke [1999a], Lazear [2003] and Booth and Zoega [2004]).  
4.  In this paper, we contribute to a growing body of literature attempting at discriminating 
empirically between these two alternative theories of training, by estimating how the probability of 
receiving general training is affected by the training wage premium — that we approximate with the 
difference between the median wage growth of trained and untrained employees in clusters of relatively 
homogeneous workers. Becker's model implies a positive relationship between the training wage premium 
and the incidence of general training. By contrast, a negative relationship falls within the possible 
outcomes of training theories based on imperfect competition in the labour market. 
                                                      
1.  See among others, Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998], Barron, Berger and Black [1999] and Sicilian [2001], as 
well as Bishop [1997] for a survey of earlier studies. 
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5.  A few recent papers have provided empirical evidence that is consistent with models of firm-
sponsored training based on imperfect competition in the labour market. In particular, panel data studies, 
which control for individual fixed effects and for job mobility, show that some of the benefits of general 
training are appropriated by workers with some lag and/or when they change employers. This evidence is 
consistent with the view that employers have some monopsony power over their own trained workers. For 
example, using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Loewenstein and 
Spletzer [1999] find that, when training imparts general skills, the estimated effect of completed spells of 
employer-paid training on earnings is three times larger for training spells completed during previous jobs 
than during the current job. Similarly, Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998] find that completed spells of 
employer-provided off-site training in the current job have no effect on current wages. By contrast, off-site 
employer-paid training received at previous employers has a positive and persistent impact on wages. 
Using more waves of the same data, Lengermann [1999] finds that the latter effect increases over time. 
Booth and Bryan [2005] study three recent waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and find 
that employer–provided training has a positive and persistent impact on wages, with evidence that the 
impact is larger for accredited training received at previous employers. Similar results are obtained by 
Blundell, Dearden and Meghir [1999], using three distant waves of the British National Child 
Development Survey (NCDS), and by Gerfin [2004] on Swiss data. 
6.  However, the presence of labour market imperfections is not the only possible explanation of the 
finding that wages after a training spell grow faster if the worker changes jobs. For instance, workers might 
undertake training to qualify for jobs in other firms that are more efficient at employing trained workers 
(see e.g. Moen and Rosen [2002]), and the main empirical predictions of the Becker model are therefore 
not necessarily in contrast with these findings. 
7.  Another way of discriminating between alternative theories of training is to investigate the 
relationship between the minimum wage and training incidence. According to Becker, high minimum 
wages should decrease investments in human capital, as they would prevent minimum-wage workers from 
accepting wage cuts to finance training. By contrast, in the alternative theories of training, the greater the 
minimum wage, the greater is the incentive for firms to pay for general training. The reason is that, in an 
imperfectly competitive labour market, the minimum wage compresses the lower tail of the wage 
distribution without necessarily affecting individual productivity (see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke [2003]). 
However, recent empirical studies in the United States and in the United Kingdom report contradictory 
findings on the impact of the minimum wage on training.
2 There are several possible reasons why this 
strand of research is inconclusive. For instance, in countries where the minimum wage is high, it might be 
difficult to find a group which is not directly or indirectly affected by the minimum wage and qualifies as a 
genuine control. Conversely, in countries where the minimum wage is particularly low, the incidence of 
training in the treatment group is likely to be extremely small, since training is relatively infrequent at the 
bottom of the wage distribution. Moreover, most of these studies focus on changes of the minimum wage 
over time, but it is not clear what time horizon is appropriate to analyze the effect of institutional changes 
such as increments in the minimum wage. Last but not least, the degree of imperfection of the labour 
market might differ across countries.  
8.  The approach we follow in this paper is similar to that taken by studies of minimum wage and 
training, insofar as we focus on the implications of the different theories on the relationship between wage 
premia and training. We use cross-country data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
and partition workers into clusters of relatively homogeneous employees (in terms of country, education, 
occupation and sector). We then construct cluster-specific measures of the training wage premium – that 
we compute as the difference between the median wage growth rates of trained and untrained employees – 
                                                      
2.  See Grossberg and Sicilian [1999], Neumark and Wascher [2001], and Acemoglu and Pischke [2003], for the 
United States, and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan [2004], for the United Kingdom. 
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and investigate whether these measures have a significant impact on general training, after dealing with the 
potential problems of endogeneity. We find a negative relationship between our measure of the training 
wage premium and the probability of taking general training. Our findings are inconsistent with the Becker 
model, which implies a positive relationship between the training wage premium and the incidence of 
general training. Conversely, although we cannot observe individual productivity gains from training, our 
findings can be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the impact of wage compression on training, to the 
extent that the (unobserved) productivity premium and the (observed) wage premium are not negatively 
correlated. Under this condition, our findings are consistent with theories based on imperfect competition. 
This approach seems to us particularly suitable to analyse the empirical relevance of different theories of 
training using European data: since the migration of labour between EU countries is still limited, we can 
meaningfully use the country dimension in the definition of clusters, which allows us to construct a sample 
with a large number of clusters and to obtain significant variation in our measures of the training 
premium.
3  
9.  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical approach, Section 3 describes 
the data and Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation of the empirical results. Conclusions follow. 
2.  General Training and Wage Premia 
10.  To fix the ideas and discuss our empirical specification, in this section we briefly sketch a 
simplified two-period model of general training, which essentially corresponds to the Becker model in the 
case of perfect competition, and to a simplified version of the model by Acemoglu and Pischke [1999a] in 
the case of imperfect competition.
4
11.  In the first period a worker is matched with an employer and training can take place. In the 
second period, the worker can quit if she receives a better wage offer. Let us denote with  ) (τ f ,  ) (τ w  and 
) (τ v  the worker’s second-period labour productivity, wage and outside option, respectively, with τ = 1 
indicating that the individual takes general training in the first period (while τ = 0 indicates that no training 
takes place). Let us assume that training is perfectly general, which is equivalent to assuming that  ) (τ f  
and  ) (τ v  do not vary across firms. In the case of perfect competition considered by Becker, 
) ( ) ( ) ( τ τ τ v w f = =  and  v w f Δ = Δ = Δ , where  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( w w w − = Δ  is the wage premium and   and Δv 
are similarly defined. Since  , if training costs c(1) are positive and c(0)=0 the employer does 
not invest. Conversely, and assuming no discounting for simplicity, the worker invests and pays the 
training costs as long as  . If training costs vary across workers, the greater the wage premium, 
the larger is the number of employees that are ready to pay for training. In other words, for a given 
individual i, the probability that she decides to take training can be written as: 
f Δ
0 = Δ − Δ w f
) 1 ( c w > Δ
 
{} { ) 1 ( Pr 1 Pr i i i c w ob ob > Δ = = } τ    [1] 
 
                                                      
3.  A testing approach based on estimating the impact of minimum wages on training can be difficult to 
implement when continental European countries are added to the sample. In countries such as Austria, 
Germany and Italy, there are no statutory minimum wages, but wage floors are defined by collective 
agreements, often at a very disaggregate sectoral level, and it is not easy to collect precise information on 
them. 
4.  See also Booth and Zoega [2004] for a very similar model. Most of the other models based on imperfect 
competition retain similar features. 
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12.  If we remove the assumption of perfect competition, the worker has to incur a cost upon quitting 
— that is, her outside option  ) (τ v is below her productivity  ) (τ f  by the amount D(τ)>0. Assume that the 
current employer wants to retain the trained worker. He can offer the worker a wage w equal to her outside 
option v plus a fraction of the gap D, that is  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( D v v f v w β β + = − + = , where β<1 
represents the worker’s bargaining power. In the absence of training, the wage offered to retain her would 
have been  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( )) 0 ( ) 0 ( ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( D v v f v w β β + = − + = . Assuming that workers cannot bear any 
training cost (e.g. because of borrowing constraints), the expected profits from training and no training are 
() ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c v f c w f − − − = − − = β π  and  () ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( v f w f − − = − = β π , 
respectively. In the decision to invest in general training, the employer compares the expected profits from 
training with the expected profits in the event of no training. The employer decides to bear the training 
costs if and only if  ) 1 ( c w f > Δ − Δ  or, equivalently,  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( β − > Δ − Δ c v f .
5 If training costs vary 
across workers, the more compressed is the wage structure (the higher  w f Δ − Δ ), the larger the number of 
employees for which employers are ready to pay for training. For a given individual i, the probability that 
she receive employer–paid training is: 
 
{} { ) 1 ( Pr 1 Pr i i i i c w f ob ob > } Δ − Δ = = τ    [2] 
 
13.  With a similar argument, it can be shown that, even when workers bear some of the training cost, 
the employer’s investment in general training increases with wage compression. In this case, however, total 
investment in training may or may not increase with wage compression, since the incentives for the 
employee to invest in training are greater, the greater the training wage premium Δw.
6 Thus, the case of 
perfect competition considered by Becker can be viewed as a special case of the Acemoglu and Pischke 
model: in the absence of labour market frictions, D is equal to zero,  ) ( ) ( ) ( τ τ τ v w f = = and the employer 
never pays for general training. Taking into account that the training that is reported to be employer-
sponsored might be indirectly paid by the worker by accepting lower wages during training, equations [1] 
and [2] can be generalised as: 
 
{} { 0 ) 1 ( Pr 1 Pr > } + Δ + Δ = = i i i i c w f ob ob δ σ γ τ  [3] 
 
with γ > 0, σ ≥ -γ and δ < 0, in the case of the Acemoglu and Pischke model,
7 and γ = 0, σ > 0 and δ < 0, in 
the case of the Becker model. 
                                                      
5.  There are several types of labour market imperfections that might make D an increasing function of training. 
See Acemoglu and Pischke [1999b] for a survey. Lazear [2003] suggests that this pattern might also emerge if 
skills are a multi-dimensional variable, with different firms using different combinations of general skills, 
except when many firms use the same combination of skills and workers can search the whole space of 
alternative jobs, which would correspond to the case of perfect competition. 
6.  In this respect, Acemoglu and Pischke’s results are similar to those by Hashimoto in his model of firm–
specific training, where the parties share the costs and benefits of the investment (see Hashimoto [1981]). 
7. The  parameter  σ can be strictly higher than -γ if employer-provided training is partly financed by the 
employee. 
  10 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
14.  Employers and employees decide on the investment in training by forming expectations about the 
training wage premium. We posit that agents form their expectations by looking at the current wage 
distribution for trained and untrained employees. The heterogeneity of workers and jobs suggests, 
however, that the relevant distribution should not be the entire wage distribution, but rather an appropriate 
portion of it. Therefore, we partition individuals into relatively homogeneous clusters and approximate the 
training wage premium with the difference between the median wage growth rates of those who reported to 
have received training in the period covered by the survey and of those who did not
8. Individual wages are 
affected both by the current training investment and by the accumulated training stock before the sample 
period. Since we can observe individual training history only for very few years, a substantial part of this 
stock is not observed. By using growth rates rather than levels, we are able to eliminate the influence on 
wages of the training stock accumulated before the reference period. We call this measure the wage growth 
differential.  
15.  Without cross-country comparable matched employer-employee datasets (see Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta and Schivardi [2005]), there are no cross-country data on individual productivity. Therefore, we 
treat the productivity gain from training  f Δ  as an omitted variable and discriminate among competing 
theories on the basis of the estimate of the parameter σ. This implies that if we find  0 ˆ < σ  (with ^ standing 
for estimate), then we will conclude that our evidence is in contrast with the empirical prediction of the 
Becker model. Conversely, we will not be able to discriminate among different theories if we find  0 ˆ ≥ σ . 
16.  How does the omission of the productivity gain  f Δ  bias our estimates? If the Becker model were 
true, omitting the productivity gain from the specification would induce no bias, since its expected 
coefficient is zero. Conversely, in the Acemoglu and Pischke model, to the extent that productivity and 
wage premia are not negatively correlated, the omission of the former would at most bias our estimates of 
σ against finding a negative relationship between the wage premium  w Δ  and training incidence. In this 
case, our estimate of σ could be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the impact of wage compression 
on training. 
17.  We do not observe training costs directly but assume that they vary with firm size, individual age, 
tenure in the job, educational attainment, type of labour contract, previous unemployment record, sector of 
activity, occupation and country. We also include a set of variables related to the employee’s household, 
such as the household structure, family responsibilities and the financial situation of the household (we will 
call these variables “family variables” hereafter), which are intended to capture the worker's opportunity 
costs of training and liquidity constraints. Letting X be the vector which includes all these controls, we 
shall assume that  i i i X c ε β δ + = ) 1 (  in equation [3].
9  
                                                      
8.  The reason why we use medians instead of averages is to reduce the weight of outliers. Nevertheless, we have 
performed a sensitivity analysis using average wage growth rates and found qualitatively similar results 
(available from authors upon request). 
9.  We experimented also with some interaction terms and other controls in the sensitivity analysis. 
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18. Letting  be the wage growth differential in cluster c, our empirical specification becomes  c ΔW
{} { 0 Pr 1 Pr > } + Δ + + = = ic c ic ic W X ob ob ε σ β α τ          [4] 
 
where the null hypothesis is  0 ≥ σ , as implied by the Becker model. 
19.  A potential objection to our empirical proxy of the wage premium is that it can be endogenous. 
For instance, if there are diminishing returns to human capital and trained and untrained workers are 
imperfect substitutes in production, we expect that the greater the stock of previously accumulated training 
the lower the productivity gain from training. Therefore, to the extent that the stock of previously 
accumulated training and the flow of training taken in the period covered by our data are correlated, we 
may find a negative relationship between the training wage premium and the probability of training even if 
the Becker's model is true.
10
20.  To take this issue into account, we test the hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the wage growth 
differential by following the methodology suggested by Smith and Blundell [1986]. To implement this test, 
we need to select at least one exogenous variable which is correlated with   but is independent of 
training incidence (or the probability of training), conditional on  . Our selected instrument is the 
difference between the log median age of those who have received training and the log median age of those 





21. We  expect   and   to be correlated because training wage premia have been found to 
decrease with age, at least in European countries (see e.g. OECD, 2004). This result is typically explained 
by the fact that, in the absence of training, the wedge between productivity and the wage tends to decrease 
with age (see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz, 2003 and Aubert and Crepon, 2004, for France), due to labour 
market institutions and sectoral characteristics that affect the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity as 
well as the extent of internal labour markets. As workers get older, thus, training simply allows matching 
non-decreasing wages with otherwise decreasing productivity, with no apparent wage premium. 
c ΔA c ΔW
22.  We argue that   also satisfies the orthogonality condition for instrument validity. First, there 
is no compelling reason for a direct causal impact of   (which is an aggregate age variable) on the 




12 Second,   is not affected by diminishing returns by construction: with diminishing 
returns, an increase in the number of trained employees is likely to affect the wage of all workers, but has 
no influence on demographic characteristics such as age. True, since younger workers are likely to be 
trained first, we expect that the greater the incidence of training, the greater is the median (log) age of 
workers who receive training as well as of those who do not. But the log age differential   will not be 
affected if the two distributions — of the log age of workers who receive training and of those who do not 
c ΔA
c ΔA
                                                      
10.  Another potential source of endogeneity is measurement error. See Bassanini and Brunello [2003] for other 
examples. 
11.  This measure roughly corresponds to the percentage difference between the two medians divided by 100. 
12.  A direct effect might emerge in the presence of large human capital externalities, if the intensity of these 
externalities varies with age. We exclude this possibility since we are aware of no evidence supporting this 
hypothesis in the literature. 
  12 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
— have the same degree of concentration around their respective medians.
13 If this is the case — as we 
show it is at the end of the next section — diminishing returns affect relative prices   without 




23.  We use individual data from the December 2001 release of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP), which is a longitudinal survey modelled on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
This survey provides a wealth of information on individual income and socio-economic characteristics for 
all EU countries and aims to be representative both in cross-sections and longitudinally. Due to the 
common questionnaire, the information contained in the ECHP is, in principle, comparable across 
countries, which is its main strength. 
24.  We use training data from the 1996 wave of the ECHP for seven countries
14 and restrict our 
attention to male employees (excluding apprentices),
15 aged from 30 to 60 years
16 and working full-time in 
the non-agricultural private sector, excluding sectors where non-profit organizations account for a non-
negligible fraction of employment.
17
25.  The main question on vocational training in the ECHP is as follows “Have you at any time since 
January (year before the survey year) been in any vocational education or training, including part-time and 
short-courses?”. From this question, we construct a dichotomous variable “training participation”, which 
                                                      
13.  To see this, assume first that, in a given cluster, an individual is trained if and only if her age is below a given 
threshold, and that increasing training incidence implies shifting this threshold upwards, thereby making the 
youngest individuals in the group of the untrained switch to the group of the trained, of which they become the 
oldest. The crucial point is that both the median log ages of trained and untrained workers are lifted up, but the 
size of their relative increase depends on the concentration of the log age distribution in the neighbourhood of 
the two medians. If the distribution has the same degree of concentration in the neighbourhood of the two 
medians, the difference between them is independent from either the size of the groups and/or the exact age of 
switching individuals, and therefore the aggregate training rate (this statement is derived formally in the 
appendix). The same argument applies if the age of the individuals switching groups because of a marginal 
increase in training incidence is below the median of the untrained and above that of the trained. Furthermore, 
the argument can be easily extended to the case in which the number of switching individuals whose age is 
above both medians is not systematically different from the number of switching individuals whose age is 
below both medians. This suffices to our purposes. In fact, if age negatively affects the probability of training 
in a significant way, we expect the age of the bulk of switching individuals to be comprised between the two 
medians, with no systematic departure in either one direction for the others. Conversely, if age does not affect 
the probability of training, there will be no problem of reverse causality potentially plaguing the validity of the 
instrument, by construction. 
14.  The choice of the survey year and the country sample is dictated by data availability (see appendix). Included 
countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In the sensitivity 
analysis we explore the robustness of results to changes in the survey year. 
15.  We exclude female employees to dampen problems of selection into employment. 
16.  We exclude individuals under 30 to reduce the risk that our results be altered by different national institutions 
affecting the school-to-work transition (such as different apprenticeship systems, with different degrees of 
government support). We also perform a sensitivity analysis by varying the age of the sample. 
17.  This choice of sectors is due to the fact that we cannot distinguish between business enterprises and non-profit 
organizations. The model described in the previous section may not apply to the latter. Included sectors are 
mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, 
storage and communication, financial services, real estates, renting and business activities (corresponding to 
NACE Rev. 1 codes C to K). 
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takes value 1 if the individual responded “yes” and 0 if she responded “no”. Conditional on a positive 
answer, the individual is asked to report additional information on the last course only (including the type, 
whether it is still ongoing at the date of the survey and whether it is paid for or provided by the employer). 
If more than one concurrent course is involved, only the information concerning the course considered by 
the respondent as the most important is reported. Table 1 shows training events and training incidence — 
trained individuals as a percentage of the relevant population — by country and selected characteristics. 
About 17% of the individuals in our sample have experienced training, but there is a large cross-country 
variation. The country ranking shown in the table is similar to that which emerges from other cross-country 
European surveys, such as Eurostat Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS) (see Nestler and 
Kailis [2002] and OECD [2003]).  
Table 1. Training events in the sample, by country and selected characteristics. 
Country Individuals  receiving 
training (in % of the 
total) 
Other Characteristics   Individual receiving 
training (in % of the total)
Austria  159 (21.1)  Less than upper sec. educatio 201 (7.7) 
Belgium  110 (19.9)  Upper secondary education  550 (18.4) 
France  201 (15.5)  More than upper sec. educatio 443 (33.7) 
Germany  219 (19.9)  Mining, manuf. and utilities  653 (15.0) 
Italy  81 (6.7)  Services  541 (21.4) 
Spain  150 (11.8)  High-skilled occupations  622 (31.0) 
United Kingdom  274 (39.1)  Medium-skilled occupations  538 (12.4) 
Total  1194 (17.3)  Low-skilled occupations  34 (6.3) 
Note: male employees, aged from 30 to 60 years and working full-time in the non-agricultural private sector, excluding sectors where 
non-profit organizations have a non-negligible share of employment. The table shows the number of individuals who reported to have 
received training in the 1996 survey, by country and selected characteristics. Training incidence (trained individuals as a percentage 
of the relevant population) is reported in parentheses. 
26.  Respondents who have been in vocational education or training are asked to select the type of 
training received among the following categories: a) third level qualification, such as technical college; 
b) specific vocational training at a vocational school or college; c) specific vocational training within a 
system providing both work experience and complementary instruction elsewhere; d) specific vocational 
training in a working environment, without complementary instruction elsewhere; e) other.  The 
distribution of training events by type is 5.1% for type a, 16.3% for type b, 11.1% for type c, 64.6% for 
type d, and 2.8% for type e. The questionnaire also asks individuals whether the last vocational training 
course was paid for or organized by the employer. As expected, about 86.9% of the courses on which the 
information is available are paid for or organized by the employer. Interestingly, the more formal the 
training the lower the employer support: 57% for third level qualification, such as technical college; 76% 
for specific vocational training at a vocational school or college; 92% for specific vocational training 
within a system providing both work experience and complementary instruction elsewhere; and 95% for 
vocational training in a working environment. This appears to be consistent with the conjecture that on-the-
job training tends to be less general than off-the-job training. 
27.  As said in the previous section, our empirical measure of the training premium is based on 
comparing the wage growth rates of individuals who reported to have received training in the period 
covered by the survey and of those who did not — hereafter we will refer to them as “trained” and 
“untrained”, respectively. Individual wage growth is computed as the difference between the log gross 
hourly wage reported in the current wave – year 1996 – and the log wage reported in the previous wave – 
year 1995 – by the same individual. In the case of Austria, for which 1995 wage data are not comparable 
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with those from other years (see the Appendix), we replace the 1995-1996 wage growth with that of 1996-
1997. Additional information on wages is reported in the Appendix. 
28.  Table 2 shows the difference between the median wage growth rates of trained and untrained 
individuals by country, educational attainment, occupation, and sector of activity. The median wage 
growth of trained individuals is lower than the median wage growth of the untrained in Germany and Italy, 
although the difference in these countries is close to zero. The table shows a wage return in the 
range 0-2%. Although these figures might seem low, they are consistent with panel data estimates based on 
European data (see Pischke [2001], Booth and Bryan [2005], Gerfin [2004], Schøne [2004] and 
OECD [2004]). The simple comparison of Table 2 and Table 1 shows no clear correlation pattern between 
training and wage premia at this aggregate level. 
Table 2. Wage growth gaps between trained and untrained workers.  
Country Median  wage  growth, 
difference trained / 
untrained (%) 
Other Characteristics  Median wage growth, 
difference trained / 
untrained (%) 
Austria  1.05 [1.32]  Less than upper sec. education -0.08 [1.50] 
Belgium  0.33 [1.85]  Upper secondary education  0.34 [0.35] 
France  1.38 [0.72]  More than upper sec. education 1.17 [0.93] 
Germany -0.17  [0.97]  Mining,  manuf. and utilities  1.15 [0.63] 
Italy  -0.21 [2.68]  Services  0.00 [0.63] 
Spain 4.52  [2.32]  High-skilled occupations  -0.24 [0.90] 
United Kingdom  0.05 [1.48]  Medium-skilled occupations 0.61  [0.52] 
Average 0.29  [0.23]  Low-skilled occupations  5.19 [5.63] 
Note: Percentage-point difference between the median wage growth rates of those who reported to have received training in the 
period covered by the 1996 survey (1997 for Austria) and of those who did not. The sample is limited to full-time male employees 
aged from 30 to 60 years and working in the non-agricultural business sector, excluding individuals who reported to be still in training 
at the time of the survey. Wage data refer to 1995-1996 for all countries except for Austria, for which they refer to 1996-1997. 
Medians are weighted by cross-sectional weights. Bootstrapped standard errors, obtained with 100 replications, in brackets. 
29.  We compute our empirical proxy of the training wage premium (what we called the “wage 
growth differential” in the previous section and denoted with   in equation [4]) by cluster. We define 
clusters by four dimensions: the country, the educational attainment (less than upper secondary, upper 
secondary, more than upper secondary),
c ΔW
18 the broad group of sectors (mining, manufacturing, utilities and 
construction, and services),
19 and the broad occupational group (high-skilled occupations and medium- and 
low-skilled occupations).
20 By so doing we obtain 12 clusters per country, but some of them are empty.
21
                                                      
18.  Corresponding to ISCED categories, 0-2, 3, and 5-7, respectively. 
19.  Corresponding to NACE Rev. 1 industries C to F, and G and above, respectively. 
20.  Corresponding to managers, professional technicians and associate professional — ISCO-88 codes 1 to 3 — 
and to clerks, service and sales workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and 
assemblers, and elementary occupations — ISCO-88 codes 4 to 9, respectively. Low-skilled occupations are 
aggregated to medium-skilled occupations since the size and training incidence of this occupational group is 
too small to be used separately in the definition of clusters (see Table 1). 
21.  Given that in our data sectors and, especially, occupations are defined at a lower level of aggregation (see 
appendix), it might be argued that a finer partition of the data should be used to define clusters. However, since 
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30.  The wage growth differential   is obtained by computing for each cluster the difference 
between the median wage growth rates of the employees who reported to have received training in the 
period covered by the survey
c ΔW
22 and of those who did not, excluding workers who either changed cluster 
between the two wage observations or have missing cluster affiliation in one of the relevant interviews 
(about 6.5% of the sample). Since our measure of the wage growth differential should capture the cluster-
specific premium to completed training spells, we exclude from this calculation also all individuals who 
reported that they were still in training at the time of the survey or have missing information on this 
question (about 19.4% of individuals who received training in the period covered by the survey). Although 
we limit our regression analysis to workers employed in sectors where non-profit organizations are not 
important, we consider all employees in the non-public service sector in the computation of the wage 
growth differential. This is done because we believe that the whole private service sector should be 
considered as the relevant market for service sector workers.
23 Finally, in order to reduce the weight of 
outliers, we drop clusters with 30 observations or less and with less than five reported training events. 
After all these exclusions we are left with 47 valid clusters.
24 Overall, we observe no clear pattern of cross-
cluster bivariate correlation between training incidence and the wage growth differential (the correlation 
coefficient between these variables at the cluster level being only -0.13). 
31.  One problem with this measure of the training wage premium is that, given the formulation of the 
questions on training in the ECHP questionnaire (see above), when we compute the wage growth 
differential we misclassify as trained certain individuals who in fact received training only between 
January of the year before the current survey and the date of the previous survey (that is, except for 
Austria, between January 1995 and the date of the 1995 survey). As shown by Frazis and Loewenstein 
[1999], this implies that the computed wage growth differential will tend to be smaller than the value we 
would obtain if we focused only on training taken between the two survey dates (that is the dates of the 
two wage observations). Notice, however, that, to the extent that there is no reason why the proportion of 
misclassified individuals in a cluster should vary with training incidence, we can expect measurement error 
not to be systematically related to training incidence at the cluster level.
 In other words, this type of 
measurement error will, at most, bias our results towards zero, thereby making a rejection of the Becker 
model more difficult. Moreover, the absence of a systematic relationship between training incidence and 
measurement error can be tested by following the same instrumental variable procedure suggested by 
Smith and Blundell [1986], that we discussed in the previous section. 
32.  In the previous section we argued that the difference in the log median age of trained and 
untrained employees (the log age differential  ) is a valid instrument for the wage growth differential 
. We noted, however, that this statement is correct only if there is no systematic difference in the 
concentration of the log age distributions in the neighbourhood of the median age of those who received 
c ΔA
c ΔW
                                                                                                                                                                             
our empirical measure of the training premium controls for time-invariant heterogeneity within clusters (see 
below), the error induced by heterogeneity in large clusters is likely to be smaller than the error induced by 
small cluster size. Nevertheless, in the sensitivity analysis, we explore the effect of different partitions by 
varying the grouping of occupations.  
22.  That is, for growth rates between 1995 and 1996, those who reported to have received training in the 1996 
survey and, for growth rates between 1996 and 1997, those who reported to have received training in the 1997 
survey. 
23.  We check, however, the robustness of our results by repeating the analysis using wage growth differentials 
computed only for those sectors that we use in the final regressions. 
24.  These threshold limits reduce the number of clusters by more than one third. Not surprisingly, however, 
retained clusters account for a much larger share of observations with non-missing wages (see appendix). 
Nevertheless, we check the robustness of our results by lifting these size thresholds. 
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training and of those who did not. These hypotheses can be verified by computing for each cluster, and for 
two quantiles that are not far from the median, the interquantile difference for both age distributions and by 
checking whether their cross-cluster averages are systematically different. We performed this test for the 
difference between the 55
th and the 45
th percentiles, the 60
th and the 40
th percentile and the 70
th and the 30
th 
percentiles. As shown in Table 3, no significant difference emerges for any of the three, which supports the 
validity of   as an instrument.  c ΔA
33.  Further details on the construction of the variables used in the empirical analysis as well as 
descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.  
Table 3. Tests of differences in the concentration of the log age distribution around the medians of the trained 
and the untrained. 



















Note: The table reports the cross-cluster average differences between any given interquantile difference for the log age distribution of 
those who received training and the same interquantile difference for the log age distribution of those who did not receive training. 
Averages are weighted by cluster size. Standard errors in parentheses  
4.  The Empirical Results 
34.  Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a probit model of the probability 
of taking any type of training, using the cluster - specific wage growth differential   as our measure of 
the training wage premium, and testing its weak exogeneity with respect to training. Second, we re-
estimate our model by focusing exclusively on training that is likely to be general. A series of robustness 
checks on the latter specification are presented at the end of the section and in the Appendix. 
c W Δ
35.  Table  4 shows the results of the first model, in which the dependent variable, training 
participation T, is equal to one in the event of training and to zero in the event of no training. The table is 
divided into two panels: Panel A refers to all training with no distinction in terms of financing; in Panel B 
we also use the available information on who financed the last training course and repeat the analysis by 
focusing on the probability of receiving employer-sponsored training.
25 In this case, we redefine the 
dependent variable T and set it equal to one in the event of employer – provided training and to zero in the 
event of no training.  
                                                      
25.  While we do not know whether workers indirectly paid for employer-sponsored training by accepting lower 
wages, we can be relatively confident that employers did not pay for courses that are reported to be non-
sponsored. It might therefore be desirable to eliminate these events from our dependent variable, since 
alternative theories have identical predictions for them under all circumstances. When the last training course 
is not reported to be employer-sponsored, we set therefore T to missing since we do not know whether the 
individual has taken employer-sponsored courses before the last one in the period covered by the survey. 
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36.  We take explicitly into account the fact that the training variable T and the wage growth 
differential   are measured at different levels of aggregation and adjust the standard errors by allowing 
errors to be independent between clusters and correlated within clusters (as suggested by Moulton [1986]). 
The table reports only the relevant coefficients from each equation. The estimated equation corresponding 
to Panel A is reported in the Appendix. Full results for all the other models are available from the authors 
on request. 
c ΔW
37.  We consider three specifications: the first specification includes only basic controls (family 
variables, age, education, occupation, sector and country; Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10), the second adds to these 
controls firm size (Columns 2, 5, 8 and 11), and the third includes an extended set of controls (adding 
tenure, permanent job and previous unemployment; Columns 3, 6, 9 and 12). The first three columns of 
each panel report standard estimates, while the other columns report IV estimates obtained with the 
procedure suggested by Smith and Blundell [1986]: we compute the residual from the first-stage regression 
in which the wage differential is regressed on the cluster–specific instrument   and on country, 
occupation, education and sector dummies; then we add this variable to the probit specification and re-
estimate it. The estimated coefficient of   that we obtain with this procedure is a consistent IV estimate 
of the impact of the wage growth differential. Furthermore, we can also test the weak exogeneity of the 
wage growth differential   by checking whether the estimated coefficient associated to the residual 




38.  The results that emerge from Table 4 are inconclusive. On the one hand, standard estimates point 
to no correlation between the wage growth differential   and the probability of training. On the other 
hand, IV estimates tend to suggest a much more negative and often significant relationship.
c ΔW
26 Exogeneity 
tests, however, are not clear-cut as regards which estimation procedure should be preferred. In fact, even 
though in Panel A residuals are insignificant, thereby not rejecting the exogeneity hypothesis, they are 
often large in absolute terms. Furthermore, according to the results reported in Panel B, the exogeneity 
hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level in two specifications.
27
                                                      
26.  One possible explanation of this difference is that standard estimates are strongly affected by measurement 
error, while diminishing returns is a second-order problem.
27.  The ambiguity of these results is not surprising given that our instrument is relatively weak: the value of the F-
test on the significance of the instrument is 5.0, which is relatively low (although statistically significant at the 
5% level). 
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Table 4. Probits for total training. Dependent variable: training participation T in 1996. 
Panel A: all training 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number  of  observations  5898 5728 5515 5898 5728  5515 
F-test on instrument significance   5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.154 0.171 0.179 0.154 0.171  0.179 
 
Panel B: Employer-sponsored training 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number  of  observations  5791 5623 5412 5791 5623  5412 
F-test on instrument significance   5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.167 0.190 0.201 0.168 0.191  0.202 
Note: Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Individuals reporting non-sponsored training are excluded 
from Panel B. Each column of each panel refers to a different specification. Basic controls are country, education, occupation and sector dummies plus age and family variables. 
Specifications with extended controls add tenure, permanent job status and previous unemployment dummies to firm size dummies and basic controls. In the first stage the wage 
growth differential is regressed on the median log age differential, country, occupation, education and sector dummies. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
 
39.  In Table  4 we do not distinguish between general and firm-specific training. This is 
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, alternative theories have different predictions on the relationship 
between the training wage premium and training only with regard to general training. Second, the 
inconclusive results reported in the table might be driven by the heterogeneity of training.
28  
40.  We do not have in our dataset information on the generality of skills imparted through training. 
However, as noted in the previous section, respondents who have been in vocational education or training 
are asked to classify their last course in one (and only one) of the following mutually exclusive categories: 
a) third-level qualification, such as technical college; b) specific vocational training at a vocational school 
or college; c)  specific vocational training within a system providing both work experience and 
complementary instruction elsewhere; d) specific vocational training in a working environment, without 
complementary instruction elsewhere; e)  other. Following Loewenstein and Spletzer [1998, 1999] and 
OECD [2003] we can use the distinction between off-site and workplace training to proxy the distinction 
between general and firm-specific training. Assuming that all off-site training is at least partly general, we 
treat categories a, b and c as “general training” and category d as “firm-specific training”.
29 Nevertheless, 
since training falling under category c is partly taken off-site and partly received in the workplace, we also 
experiment with a different classification by assigning category c to “firm-specific training”. Throughout 
the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the former classification as “extensive definition of general 
training” and to the latter as “restrictive definition of general training”.  
41.  Table 5 reports results obtained by re-estimating the models of Table 4 (Panel A) using general 
training as the dependent variable. In this case, we exclude the observations where the last training course 
is reported to be firm – specific, since we do not know whether these individuals also received general 
training in the period covered by the survey (as discussed above, only one answer is allowed in the 
questionnaire)
30. Three results stand out. First, under both definitions, standard estimates suggest a 
statistically significant negative correlation between the wage growth differential   and the probability 
of receiving general training.
c ΔW
31 Second, since the coefficient of the residual from the first stage is relatively 
small and statistically insignificant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the wage 
growth differential  . Third, once the residual is added to the specification, the estimated coefficient of 
the wage growth differential becomes less statistically significant. Notice, however, that the inclusion of 
the residual leads to inefficient estimates under the hypothesis of weak exogeneity.
c ΔW
32 Overall, these results 
                                                      
28.  For instance, if the true wage premium to firm-specific training is close to zero or at least much smaller than 
the true wage premium to general training, our wage growth differential   will tend to be more correlated 
with the latter than with the former. Therefore, the greater the share of firm-specific training in total training in 
our sample, the greater is the importance of measurement error. 
c ΔW
29.  The option “other” cannot be classified and we choose to drop it from the sample. 
30.  The key results in Table 5 are not affected in a qualitative way if we explicitly account for both general and 
firm-specific training and use multinomial logit models. See the Appendix for details. 
31.  One might argue that we should use as wage growth differential the difference between the wage growth of 
those who received general training and of those who received no training. However, due to the relatively low 
incidence of general training, we would be left with only 15 valid clusters after applying our size thresholds. 
For this reason, we do so only in the sensitivity analysis reported in the Appendix, with no qualitative change 
of results. 
32.  This argument appears more compelling in the case of the extensive definition, where the residual from the 
first stage is close to zero. However, when the restrictive definition is used, IV estimates remain significant at 
least at the 10% level. In interpreting this figure, note that it might be argued that given the structure of our 
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suggest that there is a negative relationship between the training wage premium and the individual 
probability of attending a general training course. These findings appear inconsistent with the Becker 
model, which predicts a positive relationship between the training wage premium and the incidence of 
general training. The estimated impact, however, is rather small: taking, for example, the estimates in the 
first panel, we obtain that doubling the wage growth differential from its sample mean (0.195) would 
reduce the probability of general training (using its “extensive” definition) by only 3.1%. 
42.  In Table 6 and Chart 1, we check the robustness of our results to several modifications of the 
base sample (additional sensitivity analysis — as regards specification, estimation method, computation of 
the wage growth differential and further variations in the sample — is presented in the Appendix). In 
Panels A and B of Table 6, we report results obtained using employer-sponsored general training as the 
dependent variable (excluding employees who reported that the last course taken was non-sponsored); in 
Panel C we lift the restriction of five trained individuals per cluster; and in Panels D and E we modify the 
age range of the sample by including employees aged from 20 to 30 years. Overall, the results presented in 
the table are consistent with those of Table 5: standard estimates of the coefficient of the wage growth 
differential are always significant and relatively stable across specifications/samples; residuals from the 
first-stage regression are often insignificant (except when the sample is composed of employees aged 
between 20 and 50 years); whenever the residual is significant and/or large in absolute terms, the IV 
estimate of the coefficient of the wage growth differential is always negative and significant. 
43.  The small number of countries (7) in our sample suggests the possibility that our results might be 
driven by a single country. We assess the robustness of our findings to variations in country coverage by 
eliminating one country at a time and re-estimating our models. Chart  1 reports the results of this 
sensitivity analysis for the estimated coefficients of the impact of the wage growth differential on the 
propensity to take general training, using the extensive definition of general training (with extended 
controls only). Coefficient estimates are substantially robust to variation of country coverage. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
null hypothesis a one-tail test would be more appropriate than a two-tail test. P-values derived on the basis of 
two-tail tests can be seen as lower bounds to the actual P-value. 
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Table 5. Probits for general training. Dependent variable: Participation in general training in 1996. 
Panel A: Extensive definition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number of observations  5178  5028  4857  5178  5028  4857 
F-test on instrument significance    5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00  5.00 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.226 0.230 0.243 0.226 0.230  0.243 
 
Panel B: Restrictive definition 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number of observations  5090  4940  4771  5090  4940  4771 
F-test on instrument significance    5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00  5.00 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.244 0.243 0.250 0.244 0.244  0.250 
Note: Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Individuals reporting firm-specific training are excluded from 
the sample. Each column of each panel refers to a different specification. The extensive definition of general training is used in Panel A, the restrictive one in Panel B. Basic controls are 
country, education, occupation and sector dummies plus age and family variables. Specifications with extended controls add tenure, permanent job status and previous unemployment 
dummies to firm size dummies and basic controls. In the first stage the wage growth differential is regressed on the median log age differential, country, occupation, education and 
sector dummies. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively.   DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
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Table 6. Robustness checks. Dependent variable: Participation in general training in 1996. 
Panel A: Employer-sponsored training, extensive definition, base sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number  of  observations  4131 4103 4076 4131 4103  4076 
F-test on instrument significance   7.14  7.14  7.14 7.14 7.14  7.14 
Pseudo R-squared  0.271  0.290 0.304 0.271 0.291  0.304 
Panel B: Employer-sponsored training, restrictive definition, base sample 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number of observations  3920  3895  3871  3920  3895  3871 
F-test on instrument significance    7.14 7.14 7.14 7.14 7.14  7.14 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.286 0.296 0.310 0.287 0.297  0.311 
Panel C: All training, extensive definition, no threshold on the number of trained individuals 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)  (18) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  no  no  yes 
Number of observations  5393  5234  5057  5393  5234  5057 
F-test on instrument significance    5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65  5.65 
Pseudo R-squared  0.220  0.223  0.236  0.221  0.223  0.236 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
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Table 6 (cont.). Robustness checks. Dependent variable: Participation in general training in 1996. 
Panel D: All training, extensive definition, age 20-60 
  (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)  (24) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  No  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  No  no  yes 
Number of observations  7142  6929  6675  7142  6929  6675 
F-test on instrument significance    5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91  5.91 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.182 0.188 0.204 0.183 0.188  0.204 
Panel E: All training, extensive definition, age 20-50 
  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)  (30) 


















Basic controls  yes yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Controls for firm size  no yes  yes  No  yes  yes 
Extended controls  no no  yes  No  no  yes 
Number of observations  6046  5861  5638  6046  5861  5638 
F-test on instrument significance    3.69 3.69 3.69 3.69 3.69  3.69 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.179 0.185 0.203 0.180 0.186  0.204 
Note: Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Individuals reporting firm-specific training are excluded from 
the sample. Each column of each panel refers to a different specification. The extensive definition of general training is used except in Panel B. In Panels A and B individuals reporting 
non-sponsored training are excluded from the sample (France is also excluded from the sample in this case since no French individual reported general employer-sponsored training). 
Each column of each panel refers to a different specification. In Panel C, the threshold of at least five trained individuals per cluster is removed. In Panels D and E, the age range of the 
sample is modified as indicated. Basic controls are country, education, occupation and sector dummies plus age and family variables. Specifications with extended controls add tenure, 
permanent job status and previous unemployment dummies to firm size dummies and basic controls. In the first stage the wage growth differential is regressed on the median log age 
differential, country, occupation, education and sector dummies. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
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The figure shows central estimates and confidence intervals obtained by re-estimating the
 model (with extended controls) after excluding one country at a time from the sample. NONE identifies
 the specification with all 7 countries for the purpose of comparison.
Chart 1.  Sensitivity to variation of country coverage



































5% confidence interval: lower bound estimated coefficient 5% confidence interval: upper bound
Country excluded
 
5. Conclusions   
44.  According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, only the worker will 
invest in general training, since she is the only agent who can reap the benefits from the investment. To the 
extent that labour market imperfections are of limited empirical relevance as regards training, the Becker 
model represents a simple and powerful model to think about training in practical terms. We can test this 
statement by looking at the predictions of the model concerning the relationship between the training wage 
premium and training. In the Becker model, we expect that the greater the wage premium, the greater is the 
training investment. By contrast, as a large body of literature has pointed out, when labour markets are 
imperfectly competitive, firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is 
compressed, that is if the increase of productivity after training is faster than the increase in pay. In this 
case, a negative relationship between the training wage premium and training might emerge, to the extent 
that the training wage premium is not positively correlated with wage compression. 
45.  In this paper, we contribute to the literature that tries to shed light on the empirical relevance of 
alternative theories of training, by exploiting the cross–country variation in training incidence and training 
wage premia in some European Union countries. We find that the probability of receiving general training, 
proxied in the paper with off-site training, is higher in clusters — defined by country, sector, occupation 
and educational attainment — with a lower differential between the median wage growth of trained and 
untrained employees. Importantly, the negative and statistically significant correlation between the training 
wage premium and training incidence does not seem to reflect the potential endogeneity of the former 
variable and holds also when general training is employer–provided.  
46.  While statistically significant, the estimated impact of changes in the training wage premium on 
the probability of general training is rather small: conditional on an extended set of controls, a 1% increase 
in the wage growth differential is expected to reduce the probability of general training by about 0.03%. 
However, to the extent that productivity gains from training and training wage premia are not negatively 
correlated, this number is likely to be only a lower bound estimate of the effect of wage compression on 
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general training. Should matched employer-employee data become available on a cross-country 
comparable basis, the magnitude of the effect of wage compression on training incidence could be 
precisely estimated using our empirical framework, by controlling for the productivity gains from training 
at the individual and firm level. 
47.  Overall, our findings suggest that competitive theories of the labour market, which imply a 
positive relationship between the training wage premium and the incidence of general training, provide 
insufficient guidance to interpret empirical training patterns. In particular, one should be cautious before 
assuming that labour market reforms inducing a greater alignment of wages and productivity would 
automatically lead to more investment in human capital. Conversely, training patterns are not inconsistent 
with the view that economic environments with higher wage compression can help firms organize and pay 
for general training, as predicted by the recent theories of training in imperfect labour markets. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Definition of co-variates and descriptive statistics 
48.  Wage growth differentials are defined in terms of gross hourly wages, computed from normal 
gross monthly earnings in the main job at the date of the interview, by dividing them by 52/12 and by the 
number of usual weekly hours of work. Overtime pay and hours are included, but individuals who are 
either still in training in the final year or work less than 30 hours per week (despite declaring to work full-
time) or more than 70 hours per week are excluded. Similarly, we exclude workers who change cluster 
between the two interviews (or with missing cluster affiliation in the first interview). Wage growth 
differentials (as well as log age differentials) are computed using ECHP personal weights. Although in 
principle there are 84  clusters, non-missing wage growth information for both individuals receiving 
training and not receiving training is available in 1996 only in 79  clusters (with an average training 
incidence of 15.1%).
33 Furthermore, the thresholds of 30 observations and five training events imply that 
the effective sample is reduced to 47 clusters, although, not surprisingly, retained clusters are larger and 
account for about 90% of observations with non-missing wage growth information (with an average 
training incidence of 14.9%).
34
49.  As described in the text, all specifications control for age, educational attainment, occupation, 
sector and country as well as for a set of family variables. Family variables (see Table A2) include 
household type (grouped into eight categories), a dummy for presence of children aged less than 12 years, 
a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent thinks that looking after other persons prevented him from 
working as much as he wanted, and a series of variables proxying the financial situation of the family 
(including indicators of home ownership, the burden of accommodation costs including mortgage, the 
number of rooms divided by household size and whether the household received an heritage of at least 
EUR 2 000 in the last 12 months). In the regressions, age is measured in years, while all other co-variates 
(with the exception of wage growth differentials and rooms per household member) are categorical, and 
coded as sets of dummy variables (omitting one dummy per set for identification). We consider three 
educational attainment levels (less than upper secondary, upper secondary, more than upper secondary, 
corresponding to standard ISCED categories 0-2, 3, and 5-7), eight occupational groups (corresponding to 
standard ISCO-88 codes 1 to 9 with the exclusion of skilled agricultural workers, or ISCO-88 code 6), 13 
sectors (listed in Table A1), 4 firm-size classes, a dummy for permanent contract, a dummy for at least one 
spell of unemployment since 1989, and five tenure classes. Tenure is obtained as the difference between 
the survey year and the calendar year of start of the current job. We grouped the data into five classes 
rather than using a continuous variable for two reasons: i) the information is censored at 15 years; and ii) 
computed this way, tenure measures are highly imprecise. For example, an individual who is surveyed in 
December but was hired in January of the survey year would be accounted as having tenure shorter than 
                                                      
33.  In the case of Austria, wage growth is computed for 1997, due to data quality problems (see Section A.2 in this 
appendix). 
34.  Training incidence in the sample used to compute wage growth differentials is smaller than in the sample used 
for the final regressions because individuals still in training at the time of the interview are excluded in the 
former but obviously not in the latter. 
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another individual who started in December of the year before the survey year but was surveyed in 
January.
35 The means of the co-variates used in the regressions are reported in Table A2.
36
Table A1. List of included sectors  
NACE Rev.1 Codes  Sector definition     
C+E  Mining and quarrying + Electricity, gas and water supply     
DA  Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco       
DB+DC  Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products       
DD+DE  Manufacture off wood and paper products; publishing and printing     
DF-DI  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum/chemicals/rubber & plastic products 
DJ+DK  Manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipment n.e.c.     
DL-DN  Other  manufacturing         
F  Construction         
G  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household 
goods 
H  Hotels and restaurants           
I  Transport, storage and communication         
J  Financial  intermediation        
K  Real estate, renting and business activities         
Note: excluded sectors are: agriculture (A+B) as well as public administration and defence, compulsory social security, education, 
health and social work, other community, social and personal service activities, private households with employed persons and extra-
territorial organizations and bodies (L to Q). 
A.2 Data quality and sample selection 
50.  Our ECHP release contains longitudinal data for five years (1994-1998), although not all 
countries are available in each wave. The country sample is chosen on the basis of data availability: 
Sweden has no wage growth data; Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal, have either a very small 
sample or very small training incidence, so that almost no cluster would be retained for these countries 
after applying the thresholds of 30 observations and 5 training events; and Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Finland have no information on training type (or that information is almost always missing). Thus, these 
eight countries are excluded from the sample, leaving us with seven countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), although there are no data for Austria in 1994 and 
complete data for France, Germany and the UK are available only until 1996 included (for the UK the 
disaggregation by type of training is however available only in 1996). 
                                                      
35.  Information on the month of the interview is also available in the ECHP. However, this information is always 
missing in Germany (for confidentiality reasons) and often missing in a few other countries. For this reason, 
we opted not to use it. 
36.  The standard deviations of age and rooms per household member, the only continuous variables in the sample 
beside the wage growth differential, are 8.1 years and 0.74, respectively. 
  28 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
Table A2. Means of co-variates (baseline sample: age 30 to 60 years, year: 1996). 
Variable Mean  Variable  Mean 
Age (years)  42.2  % NACE G  14.2 
% tenure 1 year or less  12.6  % NACE H  2.4 
% tenure 2 to 5 years  16.4  % NACE I  6.6 
% tenure 6 to 9 years  15.1  % NACE J  6.5 
% tenure 10 to 14 years  11.5  % NACE K  6.9 
% tenure 15 years or more  44.4  % Austria  10.9 
% firm size less than 50 employees  45.1  % Belgium  8.0 
% firm size 50-99 employees  10.5  % France  18.8 
% firm size 100-499 employees  18.5  % Germany  16.2 
% firm size 500 employees or more  25.9  % Italy  17.6 
% tertiary education  19.1  % Spain  18.4 
% upper secondary education  43.3  % United Kingdom  10.1 
% less than upper secondary education  37.6  Family variables:   
% Legislators, senior officials and managers  9.3  Number of rooms per household member  1.39 
% Professionals  7.1  % received an heritage in the last 12 months  1.98 
% Technicians and associate professionals  12.8  % housing costs are a heavy burden  19.55 
% Clerks  10.6  % housing costs are somewhat a burden  46.45 
% Service and shop and market sales workers  5.5  % housing costs are not a problem  33.99 
% Craft and related trades workers  31.0  % house owners  71.43 
% Plant and machine operators and assemblers  16.0  % tenants  24.59 
% Elementary occupations  7.8  % with rent-free accommodation  3.98 
% previous unemployment  29.3  % limited in work effort by looking after others  0.95 
% permanent contract  89.7  % children aged less than 12 in the household  43.73 
% NACE C+E  2.8  % one person household  5.92 
% NACE DA  4.8  % single parent with one or more children  3.10 
% NACE DB+DC  2.7  % couple without children  14.96 
% NACE DD+DE  4.7  % couple with one child (aged less than 16)  13.06 
% NACE DF-DI  7.9  % couple with two children (all children aged 
less than 16)  17.51 
% NACE DJ+DK  14.2  % couple three or more children (all children 
aged less than 16)  5.43 
% NACE DL-DN  11.1  % couple with children (at least one child aged 
16 years or more)  33.46 
% NACE F  15.2  % other households  6.56 
51.  Unit non-responses and attrition rates in the ECHP are comparable with those of other 
longitudinal household surveys [Peracchi, 2002]. Nevertheless, due to small entry rates, attrition results in 
a reduction of the sample size that is increasing with time. Focusing only on the countries that are present 
in two consecutive waves, the loss of observations due to attrition and insufficient replacement amounts to 
about 7% between the first (1994) and the second (1995) wave, to 4% between the second and the third 
(1996) wave, and to 6% between the third and the fourth (1997) wave, as well as between the fourth and 
the fifth (1998) wave. 
52.  We choose to undertake a cross-sectional analysis of 1996 data only (and not to exploit further 
the longitudinal structure of the ECHP by pooling together more than one wave) because this year has 
much larger country coverage, higher number of clusters, smaller non-response rates and bigger sample 
size. In fact, in 1996 we can cover seven countries in our data. Conversely, taking into account the lack of 
data on training type in certain countries and years, we can include only six countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain), in 1995, four countries (Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain), in 1997, 
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and, taking into account item non-responses, only three countries (Austria, Belgium and Spain), in 1998. 
After applying our size thresholds, there are 47 clusters in 1996,
37 while there can be at most 40 clusters in 
1995,
38 22 clusters in 1997 and only 16 clusters in 1998. Moreover, in 1996 there are 7 196 male wage and 
salary employees, aged from 30 to 60 years and working full-time in the non-agricultural market-based 
sectors. Excluding observations with missing values either in the training variables or other covariates 
(with the exception of the wage growth differential), this sample drops to 6 230 individuals, corresponding 
to 87% of the original sample. If we also drop observations for which the wage growth differential is not 
defined (because of the thresholds of 30 observations and five trained individual per cluster), the sample 
drops further to 5  515 observations (77% of the original sample). Conversely, male wage and salary 
employees, aged from 30 to 60 years and working full-time in the non-agricultural market-based sectors 
are 7 618, 3 827 and 2 546 in 1995, 1997 and 1998, respectively. These figures drop to only 3 896, 3 607 
and 2 407, respectively, when observations with missing values are excluded, and drop even further when 
observations for which the wage growth differential is not defined are excluded. 
53.  We also perform a sensitivity analysis on 1995 data (see below). With 1995 data, however, we 
are confronted with an additional problem: in many countries, wage data from the first available ECHP 
wave are not comparable with data from subsequent waves (see OECD [2004]). For this reason, we use 
1996-1997 wage growth rates for Austria – the country in our sample with data starting from 1995 - 
throughout the analysis and we use 1995-1996 wage growth rates in the sensitivity analysis with 1995 
training data, for all countries except Austria. 
54.  Eurostat’s guidelines specify that National Data Collection Units (NDUs) are requested to use 
country-specific categories of education and training according to the classification used in the national 
Labour Force Surveys (LFS). In order to facilitate the coding of training questions by the NDUs, Eurostat 
provides a correspondence between LFS and ECHP categories. In the case of France and the United 
Kingdom, no national LFS category corresponds to ECHP category d (specific vocational training in a 
working environment, without complementary instruction elsewhere). However, some training is reported 
to fall under this category in the British and French data. We choose to keep these countries in our sample, 
but we also check whether our findings are driven by misclassification by replicating our regression 
analysis on a sub-sample of countries which exclude France and the UK. All results that are presented in 
the paper are robust to the simultaneous elimination of these two countries (detailed results are available 
from the authors on request). 
A.3 Full estimation results for Table 4 
                                                      
37.  43 without Austria, for which we use 1996-1997 wage growth differentials (see below). 
38.  36 without Austria. 
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Table A3. Probits for total training. Dependent variable: training participation T in 1996. 
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Previous unemployment spell      -0.140** 




(ref: 0-1 years) 
       
          Tenure: 2-5 years      -0.235** 
(0.117)    
-0.234** 
(0.117) 
          Tenure: 6-9 years      -0.236** 
(0.103)    
-0.238** 
(0.103) 
          Tenure: 10-14 years      -0.133 
(0.102)    
-0.134 
(0.102) 
          Tenure: 15 years or more      -0.178 
(0.113)    
-0.177 
(0.113) 
Permanent job      0.259*** 
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Joint significance of family variables (P-value)  0.001  0.005  0.006  0.001  0.005  0.006 
Number of observations  5898  5728  5515  5898  5728  5515 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.154 0.171 0.179 0.154 0.171  0.179 
Note: Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Additional controls not in the table are family variables and 
country, occupation and sector dummies. In the first stage the wage growth differential is regressed on the median log age differential, country, occupation, education and sector 
dummies. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2006)10 
A.4 Further sensitivity analysis 
55.  A feature of the analysis in the main text is that we have ignored firm – specific training. In 
Table A4, we take more explicitly into account the fact that general and specific training are mutually 
exclusive categories by design by estimating a multinomial logit model with three outcomes, using no 
training as the baseline category. In the case of total training, the dependent variable (TYPE) takes the 
value 0 in the case of no training, 1 in the case of general training, and 2 in the case of firm-specific 
training. In the case of employer-sponsored training, we define another dependent variable (TYPEM), 
which takes value 0 in the case of no training, 1 in the case of employer-sponsored general training, 2 in 
the case of employer-sponsored firm-specific training, and 3 in the case of non-sponsored training. General 
and firm-specific non-sponsored training are grouped together due to the small number of non-sponsored 
training events in our sample. As before, we use both the “extensive” and the “restrictive” definition of 
general training. We have also estimated extended specifications that include the residual from the first-
step regression, which turned out to be always statistically insignificant (with confidence intervals obtained 
by bootstrapping, using 1000 i.i.d. resamplings). Results are available upon request.  
56.  We find that the estimated coefficient associated to our measure of the training wage premium 
 is always negative and statistically significant, in the case of general training, and close to zero and 
not statistically significant, in the case of firm–specific training. Note, however, that the latter finding 
cannot be taken as evidence that wage compression does not provide firms with an incentive for firm-
specific training. The reason is that if the true premium to firm-specific training is much smaller than the 
true premium to general training, our measure of the wage premium will tend to be more correlated with 
the latter than with the former. In other words, our simple measure is too noisy a proxy of the wage 
premium associated to firm-specific training to allow us to infer something about the relationship between 
the wage structure and firm-specific training.  
c ΔW
57.  We explore also the effect of the wage growth differential on each separate category of training. 
In order to do so, we define two new dependent variables: DTYPE, which takes value 0 in the case of no 
training, 1 in the case of third level qualification or other vocational training at a vocational school or 
college (we group together these two categories due to the small number of training spells leading to third 
level qualification in the sample), 2 in the case of dual systems with both workplace and school training 
and 3 in the case of workplace training only; and DTYPEM which is equal to DTYPE for employer-
sponsored training and to 4 when training is not employer-provided. Since these categories are not 
naturally ordered, but are mutually exclusive by design, we estimate two multinomial logit models with 4 
and 5 categories, respectively, using no training as the baseline category.  
58.  Table A5 shows the estimated coefficients associated to the wage growth differential in the 
specifications with extended controls (similar results are obtained if we use basic controls). Point estimates 
are higher for training which is at least partially off-site – categories 1 and 2 – than for workplace training 
– category 3 – although standard errors of the second category are relatively large, due probably to the 
small number of training spells falling into it. 
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Table A4. General and specific training. Trinomial and quadrinomial logits. Dependent variable: Total and 
employer provided training in 1996. 
Panel A: Extensive definition of general training 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total training  Employer-sponsored training 
  Basic controls  Extended controls  Basic controls  Extended controls 
General training  -3.945*** (1.218)  -4.168*** (1.150)  -4.307*** (1.458)  -4.946*** (1.412) 
Firm-specific training  -.085       (.962)    -.425      (1.028)     .251      (1.010)    -.247      (1.067) 
Panel B: Restrictive definition of general training. 
 (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Total training  Employer-sponsored training 
  Basic controls  Extended controls  Basic controls  Extended controls 
General training  -3.853**  (1.717)  -4.121**  (1.723)  -4.146**  (1.962)  -4.747**  (1.940) 
Firm-specific training  -.412      (.864)  -.772      (.951)  -.135      (.977)   -.660       (1.053) 
Note: Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Each 
column of each panel refers to a different specification. In Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) the dependent variable is the type of training 
(TYPE), while in Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) the dependent variable is the type of employer-sponsored training (TYPEM). Only 
estimated coefficients of the wage growth differential are reported. Basic controls are country, education, occupation and sector 
dummies plus age and family variables. Extended controls add tenure, firm size, permanent job status and previous unemployment 
dummies. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
Table A5. Disaggregating training type. Dependent variable: Total and employer provided training. Multinomial 
logits with 4 and 5 characteristics, respectively. 
 (1)  (2) 
  Total training  Employer provided training 
1. vocational training at school or college  -4.202** (1.726)  -4.970** (1.933) 
2. workplace training and complementary 
instruction elsewhere  -2.373     (2.348)  -3.405     (3.008) 
3. workplace training without complementary 
instruction elsewhere  -.421        (1.029)  -.260       (1.067) 
Note: Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the disaggregated type of 
training (DTYPE), while in Column (2) the dependent variable is the disaggregated type of employer-sponsored training (DTYPEM). 
Only estimated coefficients of the wage growth differential are reported. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Other 
controls are country, education, occupation, sector, tenure, firm size, permanent job status and previous unemployment dummies 
plus age and family variables. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence, respectively.  
59.  In Table A6, we consider a number of other robustness checks using the probit specification with 
extended controls and the extensive definition of general training. First, we try to control better for 
composition effects by adding to our regressors country-by-sector dummies and the employment rate in 
1996 by country and educational attainment (which we matched to our sample using data from the 
European Labour Force Survey).
39 Second, we modify cluster definitions by dividing the group of 
                                                      
39.  One reason to include country-by-industry dummies is that the composition of each sector varies by country, 
which could bias our estimates if better workers flow into sub-sectors where training opportunities and wage 
prospects are better. We also include the employment rate, which varies by country and educational 
attainment, because greater statutory or contractual minimum wages may reduce employment among the 
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medium/low-skilled workers into low-skilled and medium-skilled workers. This is equivalent to excluding 
the former category, since training incidence is small in that group (see Table 1). We also consider three 
alternative splits of the group of medium/low-skilled occupations: i)  between clerks and all the other 
groups; ii) between white collars and sales workers, on the one hand, and other blue collars, on the other; 
and iii) between white collars, sales workers and craft and related trade workers, on the one hand, and plant 
and machine operators and assemblers and low-skilled occupation, on the other. Third, we check whether 
our results are affected by the fact that sectors where non-profit organizations are not important are 
included in the computation of the wage growth differential but not in the final regressions, by estimating 
the baseline specification on all sectors or excluding these sectors from the computation of  . Fourth, 
we check the robustness of our results to measurement error in five additional ways: i) we compute   




40 ii) we compute   including also workers who change cluster between the two 
interviews; iii) we compute   only for workers who did not change employer between the two 
interviews; iv) we use wage level differentials instead of wage growth differentials to measure training 
wage premia; and v) we compute   as the difference between the median wage growth rates of 
workers who took general training and of those who took no training. Finally, we lift both our size 




60.  In the last two rows of the table, we also verify whether our results can be attributed to the 
selected year (1996) or to the choice of the year for the computation of the wage growth differential (1995-
1996, except for Austria). First, we re-estimate our models on 1995 data (except for wage growth 
differentials).
41 Second, we take the average of the wage growth differentials in 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 
for the countries where both differentials can be computed and we re-estimate our models by using this 
average as our measure of  .  c ΔW
61.  Overall, from these sensitivity exercises it can be concluded that our key findings are robust to 
changes in the definition of the key variables and in the model specification. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
untrained (particularly among the least able workers) without affecting the number of workers who are trained, 
thereby driving up training incidence among the employed and driving down the wage growth differential (we 
also experimented with education-by-country dummies with similar results). 
40.  The ECHP contains start and end dates of the last training spell that, in principle, could be matched with the 
date of the previous interview to exactly identify those individuals who took some training between two 
interviews. In practice, however, this information is often missing. Furthermore, interview dates are not 
available for Germany. For this reason, to preserve sample size and country coverage, we prefer to compute 
wage growth differentials using exact training dates only for this sensitivity analysis. 
41.  Wage data in 1994 are not comparable with data in 1995. For this reason, wage growth differentials for 1994-
1995 cannot be computed (see above). 
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Table A6. Other robustness tests. Probit models. Dependent variable: Participation in general training 
(extensive definition).  
A. Country X sector dummies  -1.599** 
(0.695) 
I. Exact training dates to compute ΔWc -2.101*** 
(0.799) 
B. Country X sector dummies + empl. rate  -1.399* 
(0.742) 
J. Cluster-movers also to compute ΔWc -1.721*** 
(0.549) 
C. No low skilled  -1.854*** 
(0.609) 
K. Job-stayers only to compute ΔWc -1.500*** 
(0.581) 
D. Three occupational groups (1)  -1.124* 
(0.646) 
L. Wage level data to compute ΔWc -0.576*   
(0.302) 
E. Three occupational groups (2)  -0.829 
(0.622) 
M. ΔWc based on general training only  -2.175*** 
(0.437) 
F. Three occupational groups (3)  -1.749** 
(0.694) 
N. No size thresholds  -0.730** 
(0.335) 
G. All sectors  -1.212**   
(0.532) 
O. Wave 2 (1995)  -2.047*  
(1.102) 
H. No non-market sectors to compute ΔWc -1.426***   
(0.442) 
P. Wave 3 (1996), average ΔWc -1.109**  
(0.567) 
Note: Cluster adjusted robust standard errors within parentheses. Observations are weighted by ECHP personal weights. Individuals 
reporting firm-specific training are excluded from the sample. Each cell of the table refers to a different regression. Only estimated 
coefficients of the wage growth (or wage level) differential are reported. General training is defined according to the extensive 
definition. Other controls are country, education, occupation, sector, tenure, firm size, permanent job status and previous 
unemployment dummies plus age and family variables. In Row A country by sector dummies are added to the baseline specification; 
in Row B both country by sector dummies and the employment rate (by country and education) are added to the baseline 
specification; in row C elementary occupations are excluded; in row D the group of medium/low-skilled occupations is divided into two 
groups (clerks, and other medium/low skilled workers) and clusters are defined accordingly; in row E service workers and shop and 
market sales workers are switched from the group of other medium/low skilled workers to the group of clerks; in row F craft and 
related trades workers are switched from the group of other medium/low skilled workers to the group of clerks, service workers and 
shop and market sales workers; in row G sectors with NACE Rev.1 code greater than K are included in the sample; in row H sectors 
with NACE Rev.1 code greater than K are not used in the computation of the wage growth differential; in row I wage growth 
differentials are computed by defining as trained only workers who started training after the date of the 1995 interview (1996 interview 
for Austria); in row J wage growth differentials are computed by including workers who changed cluster between the two interviews 
(or with missing cluster affiliation in the first interview) in which wages are measured; in row K wage growth-differentials are computed 
by excluding workers who changed employer between the two interviews in which wages are measured; in row L wage level 
differentials in 1996 are used as proxy of the training premium; in row M general training rather than total training is used to compute 
the wage growth differential; in row N the size threshold (30 observations per cluster, of which at least 5 receiving training) is 
removed; in Row O the baseline specification is estimated using data from 1995 (1995-1996 for the wage growth differential); in row P 
the baseline specification is estimated using data from 1996 (but the average of 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 for the wage growth 
differential). ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
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A.5 Proof that if younger workers are trained first, and the log age distribution has the same degree of 
concentration in the neighbourhood of the two medians, the log age differential does not depend on the 
aggregate training rate (statement made in footnote 13). 
62.  Let us assume that all workers with log age  ) (τ a x <  are trained, where τ  is the training rate and 
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hypothesis that we do not reject when using the log age (see Table 3 in the text), then 










M M d T U . In other words, if we increase the proportion of trained workers, the log age 
differential   will not be affected, since it is not affected by either the log age of switching 
individuals a, or the fraction of switching individuals in the population  , or the exact values of the 
medians   and  . 
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